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HONECKER'S LEGACY 
STEPHEN R. BOWERS 
From 1971 until 1989, under the leadership of Erich Honecker, the German 
Democratic Republic shed its thoroughly dogmatic image and developed a 
tradition of implementing reforms, particularly economic ones, and 
successfully blended technology with political orthodoxy when the rest of 
East Europe was locked in a Stalinist model. Yet, by the time of his removal 
from power in October, 1989, this former advocate of reforms was widely 
viewed as the leading opponent of reformist movements within the Soviet 
bloc. In making this transition from subservient Soviet ally to "maverick", 
Honecker's regime demonstrated not only an ability to resist reformist 
pressures and formulate policies that defied the Kremlin's leadership, but also 
a confidence to make decisions in accordance with the institutional interests of 
the ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED). It is, therefore, reasonable to suggest 
that Honecker should be remembered, not for his eventual expulsion from the 
party he once led and his subsequent arrest for treason, but for his 
development of an institutional maturity that repudiated suggestions during 
the GDR's first decades that this state was nothing more than a westward 
extension of the Kremlin. The achievement of institutional maturity by the 
Honecker regime was made possible by legitimate East German 
accomplishments in domestic policy and the grounding of SED policy within 
the framework of clear and emphatic Soviet endorsement of an East German 
"model" that enjoyed the Kremlin's respect. The eventual withdrawal of that 
support by Mikhail Gorbachev undermined a system that was beginning to 
establish itself as an unloved but nevertheless genuine socialist state on 
German soiL 
The Soviet Union's more flexible policy toward its Eastern European 
allies, one of the basic elements of the Gorbachev reforms, gave Honecker 
full authority to advocate independent positions. During the latter Honecker 
years, the" GDR leadership insisted that it was formulating policies in 
accordance with the unique East German conditions. SED spokesmen 
frequently cited their nation's strong economy as the main factor that barred 
the necessity of imitating economic reforms such as those advocated by 
Gorbachev for the USSR's struggling economy. Other more subtle factors, 
such as the GDR's proximity to an especially attractive West Germany, also 
gave coherence to a policy that attempted to maintain rather than diminish the 
differences between their own society and those of the non-communist West. 
The flight of thousands of East German citizens to the FRG in Honecker's 
40 Stephen R. Bowers 
final days and the subsequent rush toward reunification underscored the 
validity of this concern. 
As a loyal junior partner of the Soviet Union, East Germany was free to 
make explicit its opposition to reforms being pursued by the USSR. The 
SED's opposition was outlined in an internal SED memorandum distributed 
among middle-ranking party officials following Erich Honecker's talk with 
Bishop Werner Leich in 1988. In the document, which was released by the 
West German press in June, 1988, Honecker stressed his agreement with 
Gorbachev's view that every country must act in accordance with its own 
conditions of national development but argued that the GDR's ideological 
"consolidation" gave East Germany a different set of requirements from those 
of the USSR. Therefore, Honecker concluded that the GDR must approach 
its problems differently from other socialist countries and rejected basic 
features of the Soviet reform program. The SED statement rejected 
suggestions by East German church leaders that the GDR should accept the 
political implications of Soviet reforms by changing various features of the 
party's social policies, including educational policies that discriminated 
against Christians in East German schools.l 
As enthusiastic public discussions of Soviet restructuring efforts spread 
throughout both the Communist and non-Communist worlds, the Kremlin's 
East German allies were remarkably reserved with regard to these historic 
Soviet innovations. Following the CPSU Conference in June, 1988 it became 
clear that the SED was reluctant to support Gorbachev's reform efforts as 
Honecker's public comments on the Conference were limited to bland 
generalizations about the strengthening of socialism. He made no reference to 
any of the reforms embodied in Gorbachev's program nor, for t~at matter, to 
Gorbachev himself. While the Conference proceedings were broadcast live 
throughout the GDR and the party daily printed the full text of Gorbachev's 
speech, the SED leadership did not comment on the conference and avoided 
all references to perestroika, glasnost, or Gorbachev.2 
In the autumn of 1988 the SED Central Committee further elaborated its 
opposition when General Secretary Honecker denounced the advice of 
"influential" Westerners, such as West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 
who wanted the GDR to transform into a more "pragmatic" regime. Several 
prominent party figures such as Gunter Schabowski chose this opportunity to 
attack the application of glasnost to the study of Soviet and East European 
history. According to the SED view of history, a re-examination of the basic 
1 
2 
Die Welt, June 25, 1988, p. 4 and June 30, 1988, p. 8 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service- Eastern Europe (hereafter noted as FBIS-EEU) 
No.88-124, p. 28 and Michael Shafir, "East European Coverage of the Soviet Party 
Conference", Radio Free Europe (RFE), Research and Development (RAD) 
Background Report/126, July 1, 1988, pp. 3-4 
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assumptions about the consolidation of Marxist-Leninist power in the USSR 
and Eastern Europe is a dangerous error. Such an undertaking, according to 
Schabowski, would only aid those West German foes of the GDR 
determined to misuse such concepts as "perestroika" and "glasnost" in an 
effort to undermine socialism. While stressing the unshakable foundations of 
the Soviet-GDR alliance, the SED Central Committee maintained that the 
international reputation of the GDR and its political and economic successes 
were the result of the SED's "prudent policy". This policy, the Central 
Committee insisted, was "based on Marxism-Leninism, the specific 
conditions of the GDR", and a recognition of the fact that "the class struggle 
is escalating in an ideological sense". The latter observation was an obvious 
rejection of Gorbachev's suggestion that the role of the party be reduced and 
the Soviet leadership's emphasis on "humanitarian" issues in contrast to 
"class" issues. Such a reduction in the role of the party would, in the view of 
several SED spokesmen, transform the party from an instrument of socialist 
construction into a mere debating society.3 
Under Honecker's leadership East German opposition to the re-
examination of history was exhibited in two incidents. One was the 
government's announcement in November, 1988 of a prohibition against the 
import into the GDR of the popular Soviet monthly press digest Sputnik. 
Although specific issues of Soviet periodicals had been banned in the past 
when they dealt with sensitive issues, there had never been a general ban of 
this nature. Shortly after this announcement, there were protest 
demonstrations in East Berlin, Leipzig, Jena, Weimar, and Halle as well as 
numerous withdrawals from the SED by party members who objected to the 
action against Sputnik, events that served as a prelude to the dramatic 
displays of popular unrest that occurred less than a year later.4 The second 
incident was sparked by the activism of the Soviet film industry and was 
directed against the film "Repentance", cm.e of the USSR's most critical 
examinations of Stalinism and a feature on West German television in 1987. 
"Repentance" was denounced by both Neues Deutschland and Junge Welt, 
the journal of the party youth organization, as a "stone-age view mocking all 
those millions of people who risked their lives for mankind's progress" and a 
"mocking denunciation of revolutionary vigilance." In the SED's view, there 
were "practical and theoretical mistakes" during the Stalin period, but Stalin 
should receive credit for leading the USSR through collectivization and 
industrialization and for securing the unanimity of the party when socialism 
was faced with daily threats to its very survival. It was only through Stalin's 
3 
4 
Neues Deutschland, December 3-4, 1988, pp. 3-16 and RFE, RAD Background 
Report/240, December 6, 1988, pp. 1-4 
RFE, RAD Background Report/233, November 23, 1988, pp. 1-3 and Suddeutsche 
Zeitung, January 10, 1989, p. 2 
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leadership, the SED insisted, that the Soviet Union was able to overcome 
foreign "intervention, sabotage, opportunism, Trotskyism, and bourgeois 
nationalism". According to a Neues Deutschland editorial, the only purpose 
served by "Repentance" was the provision of new ammunition for the 
enemies of socialism, especially those in West Germany who sought to smear 
the SED for its association with what was being presented as a "terrorist" 
Soviet regime. 5 
East German criticisms targeted both economic and political reforms 
advanced by its WTO allies. A general observation in Neues Deutschland 
summarized the SED position with its insistance that the party should always 
play the leading role in society, that industry should be operated by the state 
rather than by private enterprises whether East German or Western, and that 
the economic foundations of the regime should be based not on capitalistic 
laws of supply and demand but upon an arrangement of subsidized prices. 
Unemployment, a basic element of many Eastern European economic 
reforms, did not, in the SED's view, represent a rational alternative to the 
problem of inefficient industry but was a violation of the constitutionally 
guaranteed right to work.6 
Confidence as a motive for opposition 
A significant indication of the GDR's institutional development by the end of 
the Honecker era was that the regime displayed a greater confidence in its 
own achievements. In spite of the obvious problems the government faced, 
the dramatic flight of thousands of its citizens in 1989 being one of the most 
conspicuous, the regime did enjoy some advantages, especially when the 
GDR is compared with the other communist party regimes of East Europe. 
One that was rarely noted and infrequently documented was the level of 
popular support that the government enjoyed as a result of its active social 
welfare programs. The exodus of 1989 and the large public protests 
immediately prior to Honecker's removal have obscured indications of 
support that the policies of the SED had won among some segments of the 
GDR's population. A West German polling organization, the Infas Polling 
Institute, examined this question in the spring of 1989 and found that a 
surprising 53% of its sample of 880 East German adults expressed a positive 
view of the government's work. At the same time, 44% of the respondents 
indicated a desire to see the SED adopt some of the reforms being undertaken 
by the Poles and the Hungarians while only 22% specifically rejected those 
5 
6 
Neues Deutschland, October 30, 1987, p. 1 and RFE, RAD Background Report/2IS, 
November 9, 1987, pp 2-3 
IBID., February 27, 1989, p. 2 
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efforts. Granted, there are obvious qualifications that must be made with 
regard to this type of research in the GDR. What does one conclude, for 
example, from the fact that an additional 800 or more people who were 
contacted simply refused to respond? Yet, this fragmentary indication could 
well support the suggestion that the regime enjoyed some popular support, 
even among citizens expressing a desire far reforms. Comments of East 
German young people, widely reported in the Western press in the autumn of 
1989, about their continued preference for a separate East German state, in 
spite of its shortcomings, offer further support for the view that the GDR 
enjoyed some genuine popular support during that time. Equally significant 
was another survey, conducted in the more open if turbulent atmosphere of 
mid-November, which indicated that a majority of the GDR's younger 
citizens rejected the notion of dismantling the GDR in order to reunify 
Germany. A December survey conducted by the GDR Academy of Social 
Science found that 69.2% of the respondents wanted the GDR to persist as a 
separate nation while only 23.5% supported reunification with the FRG.? 
A more direct justification for the regime's optimism and confidence was 
Honecker's insistence that the SED political and economic policies had been 
effective. With this propositon as a starting point, the SED established an 
argument that only minimal adjustments were required to conform either to 
necessity or to general Soviet guidance. Accordingly, there were few SED 
voices calling for major reforms and the few that were heard were relatively 
restrained. The Central Committee's sixth plenum indicated the weakness of 
reformist elements in the GDR's ruling party. At the plenum, the leadership 
noted that East Germany was plagued by various economic problems such as 
shortages of good quality consumer goods but issued no demands for a 
restructuring of the nation's economic or political mechanisms. According to 
SED Central Committee Secretary Joachim Herrmann, the East German 
leadership had no need to alter its economic course because the Marxist-
Leninist method had always been right as long as "it has not been applied 
dogmatically." What the GDR needed, he stressed, in order to overcome its 
economic difficulties was greater discipline and the introduction of 
microelectronics in all branches of the national economy. In commenting on 
the extensive reforms of its allies, Herrmann noted that the GDR was 
"waiting for the results" of those efforts before considering their relevance to 
their needs.8 
For the most part, during this pre-glasnost era in the GDR, the leadership 
stressed only the most positive economic news and muted indications of 
negative economic trends. Accordingly, in assessing economic performance 
7 
8 
The Washington Post, October 8, 1989, p. Al, Die Welt, April 26, 1989, p. 1, NBC 
Evening News, November 21, 1989, and FBIS-EEU-90-002, January 3, 1990, p. 40. 
Volksstimme, June 10, 1988, p. 4 
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for 1989, authorities boasted that during the first quarter the economy had 
already achieved the percentage share of the growth rate planned for the 
whole year and that national income had risen by an impressive 4 percent 
while net production and labour productivity had increased by 6 percent. The 
application of key technologies, Neues Deutschland claimed, was continuing 
at "a rapid pace".9 By mid-year, authorities were boasting that in its 40th 
year the GDR had proven itself to be a "modem socialist state on German soil 
which is developing in a politically stable way, with great economic 
dynamism and a continuing performance growth in all field.of social life." It 
was not until after Honecker's removal and the flight of over 200,000 East 
German citizens, many of whom were their best workers, that the SED was 
forced to acknowledge a crisis situation in which sweeping reforms were 
needed to avoid an economic disaster that would threaten the very 
foundations of the GDR.10 
Yet, even in Honecker's last days, the regime was not oblivious to the 
economic difficulties that most citizens perceived through direct experience. 
Authorities were willing to engage in glasnost, but limited it to discussions of 
matters such as the availability of adequate housing and other social services. 
For example, while public pronouncements declared the unqualified success 
of the nation's economic plan, a confidential resolution of the SED Politburo 
instructed localleaderships to admit economic difficulties and bottlenecks that 
plague the economy. As the Politburo instructed local authorities to pay 
attention to critical remarks from citizens, it insisted that leading journalists 
take the lead in reporting on supply shortages in the official media and 
identifying responsible officials. Shortages of vegetables, industrial goods, 
and spare parts as well as poor public services were the targets of this effort. 
This directive may have been an early indication that the GDR was 
considering the eventual introduction of elements of a market economy before 
events raced out of control following Honecker's removal.11 
The SED's optimism often assumed some curious manifestations as East 
German authorities expressed a belief that their public health situation was a 
tribute to the regime's efficient practices and clear evidence of the GDR's 
superiority to Western society. For example, in 1989 one official boasted that 
the GDR had been almost completely spared from the AIDS epidemic. 
According to Niels Soennichsen, the nation's most prominent AIDS 
specialist, only 55 East German citizens were infected with HIV as of 
January, 1989 while no more than 10 actually suffered from AIDS. This 
fortunate situation, authorities insisted, was the result of a strategy that 
combined effective testing and proper treatment and a popular attitude in 
9 Neues Deutschland, April 8-9, 1989, p. 1 
10 IBID., July 20, 1989, p. 3 and The Washington Post, November 24, 1989, p. AI. 
11 Der Standard (Vienna), August 3, 1989, p. 3 
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which most citizens want to "do something for their health and a healthy way 
of life ... " In much the same spirit, East German spokesmen also boasted that 
their scientists had achieved cold fusion, thereby once again surpassing the 
West on an important concern. 12 
Foreign policy considerations 
For the most part, throughout the latter part of the Honecker era, GDR 
foreign policy embraced the notion of East-West detente, thus strengthening 
the SED argument that sweeping reforms were not required. When Politburo 
member Herman Axen visited the United States in 1988 he made a vigorous 
case that the US should award Most Favored Nation trade status to the GDR. 
Achievement of this goal would have helped East Germany meet economic 
demands through the import of more Western technology and would have 
improved its trade relationship with the non-Communist world. In addition to 
satisfying important economic objectives, such a development would have 
enabled the SED to strengthen its case against the reforms being implemented 
elsewhere in East Europe by demonstrating the utility of a non-reformist 
approach to economic advancement. The East German commitment to detente 
was most vividly illustrated by the SED's dispute with the USSR in 1984 
over the question of retaliation for NATO's deployment of new missiles in 
Europe. Honecker's opposition to the Kremlin on this vital security issue was 
later vindicated by Gorbachev's active pursuit of detente with the West and 
the USSR's abandonment of the more hard-line positions of the early 1980's. 
During this period, Honecker established the GDR as a nation whose policies 
were firmly grounded on a need for good relations with the West in general 
and with the FRG in particular. 13 
Yet, in some respects, the GDR' s foreign policy during Honecker's last 
years took a turn that was not consistent with post-Ulbricht foreign affairs. 
As pressures for reforms intensified and the radical nature of Gorbachev's 
program became more evident, that crucial icon of East Europe's reformist 
era, detente with the West, began to wear thin. A clear expression of this 
tendency was the increasing number of critical statements on the foreign 
policies of the West. Debates in the US Congress over the Bush 
Administration defence budget prompted a Neues Deutschland commentary 
denouncing the United States' determination to develop large-scale weapons 
systems instead of providing "social benefits for three million homeless" .14 A 
12 Suddeutsche Zeitung, April 1-2, 1989, p. 10 and Neue Zeit, April 7,1989, p. 5 
13 RFE, RAD Background Report/77, May 5, 1988, pp. 1-3 and RAD Background 
Report/142, July 26, 1988, pp. 1-2 
14 Neues Deutschland, July 29-30, 1989, p. 2 
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similar critical view was apparent in comments about the Federal Republic of 
Germany. When West German specialists on the GDR offered a sceptical 
analysis of East German economic performance, Neues Deutschland 
responded by warning about those in the FRG who are only interested in the 
"elimination of socialism, as well as the integration of the GDR, parts of the 
Polish People's Republic and the USSR into the FRG". The SED's 
increasingly defensive posture also led to cancellation of the planned visit by 
senior West German Social Democratic Party leaders that had been scheduled 
for September, 1989. By this time East German officials were denouncing 
what they saw as West German "economic aggression" and increasingly 
active West German "revanchist" tendencies that threatened the GDR's 
securi ty,1 5 
The weakening of detente was not consistent with East German interests 
in an era of East European reforms. The GDR's economy profited from the 
climate of international cooperation and that economic profit bolstered the 
SED's anti-reformist arguments. Yet, the resurgence of limited East-West 
hostility supported the SED's need for an enemy as a supplement to the 
regime's legitimacy. A return to some elements of the old "front-line" rhetoric 
of the 1960s enabled the SED to enlist support for its anti-reformist policies 
by attempting to rouse the spectre of West German "revanchism", an appeal 
that is doubtless effective with East Germans who might harbour a bitterness 
and resentment toward their more prosperous Western relatives. The size of 
this group among the GDR elite, while difficult to determine, was probably 
declining by the end of the decade and, at the popular level, hardly constituted 
the basis for development of a sense of national identity. The rapid collapse 
of this position in late 1989 and early 1990 indicates that Honecker's efforts 
to utilize the "front-line" rhetoric of an earlier era were a mistake. 
While Gorbachev's enthusiastic search for a deeper working relationship 
with the West threatened to undermine some East German policies, the GDR 
did benefit from one especially important element of Gorbachev's "new 
thinking", the changed Soviet-East European relationship. This new posture 
was spelled out in Gorbachev's book, Perestroika, and indicated a Soviet 
willingness to broaden the limits of diversity in East Europe. The end result 
of current Soviet pronouncements was the final repudiation of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine and its replacement by what one Soviet spokesman jokingly referred 
to as the "Sinatra doctrine", a more flexible and tolerant attitude that invites 
East European allies to adopt - within certain very broad limits - whatever 
policies that may be required by their special circumstances. The East 
European states were, in effect, encouraged to "do it their way" as long as 
they stayed within the loose framework of what was left of the Soviet bloc in 
the Gorbachev era. 
15 IBID., August 3, 1989, p. 3 and The Washington Post, September 16, 1989, pAl8 
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The most obvious consequence of the new Soviet-GDR relationship was 
that the SED became more or less free to adopt fully independent policies, as 
discussed above. In practical terms, this meant that Gorbachev was defending 
the East German right to disagree with his reform initiatives. Another result 
of Gorbachev's policy was a reduction of Soviet forces in East Germany. By 
May, 1989, Soviet troops began withdrawing from the GDR as part of the 
disarmament initiative announced by Gorbachev in December, 1988. Under 
this plan, the 25th Tank Division, the 32nd Tank Division, two independent 
tank training regiments, and eight independent battalions which together had 
4,000 tanks, were to return to the USSR by the end of the year.16 Given the 
often difficult relationship between East German citizens and Soviet soldiers, 
this move should have enhanced the popular status of the SED by 
diminishing popular perceptions that the country is simply a Kremlin outpost. 
Yet, there was a negative consequence in that reduction of the Soviet military 
contingent fostered the notion that the GDR had become less important in 
Soviet thinking and that the Soviet commitment to the regime was being 
reduced. In spite of the accomplishments of the GDR under Honecker, it is 
important to note that direct Soviet military support was one of the pillars of 
the regime's stability. A reduction in the Soviet military presence, coupled 
with a divergence of Soviet and East German policies, was certain to 
undermine the foundations of the regime. 
The achievements of the Honecker era, including the newfound 
independence of the government, were predicated on the assumption that it 
enjoyed full Soviet support and was a firm member of a secure alliance 
system. The close East German-Soviet relationship was long regarded as 
essential to the viability of the GDR and it was generally recognized that the 
regime had a clear need for membership in a cohesive and supportive East 
European bloc. The deterioration in East Germany's relations with those bloc 
nations that had embarked on a course of radical reforms - Poland and 
Hungary - weakened the overall East German position by isolating it from 
its support system. The eventual perception that the SED had also lost Soviet 
support proved destructive to the foundations of a system that Honecker had 
strengthened with Soviet suport in the eras of Brezhnev, Andropov, and 
Chernenko and paved the way for a general public debate on the merits of 
German reunification. 
A basic assumption of Honecker's anti-reformist position was that the 
reform measures of WTO nations such as Hungary were a dangerous 
precedent. The ceremonial reburial of Imry Nagy, in the SED's view, 
allowed the foes of socialism to demonstrate their hostility to that system and 
was a reminder of the continuing threat to socialist society. Hungarian 
discussions about legal actions against those responsible for Nagy's death 
16 FBIS-EEU-89-087, May 8, 1989, p. 18 
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underscored East German concerns about retributions against ageing 
Stalinists. Suggestions in November, 1989 that both Honecker and 
Bulgaria's recently deposed Todor Zhivkov faced disciplinary actions, 
coupled with the execution of Romania's Nicolae Ceausescu in December, 
emphasized the legitimacy of these concerns. A direct implication of 
Hungarian reforms for the GDR could be seen in the summer of 1989 as 
thousands of East German citizens, vacationing in Hungary, took advantage 
of the almost completely open Hungarian-Austrian frontier as a safe escape 
route to the Federal Republic. By August of 1989, East German efforts to 
prevent flight from the GDR by way of Hungary resulted in the imprisonment 
of an estimated 2,500 citizens who had attempted to escape.17 On the 
anniversary of the construction of the Berlin Wall, about 50 would-be 
emigrants demonstrated in front of the Brandenburg Gate, chanting "We want 
to get out". As this crisis grew, East German authorities, in an effort to 
provide a more reliable vacation spot for their citizens, were forced to journey 
to Tirana for a discussion of the prospects of developing a tourist 
infrastructure in Albania that could accommodate groups of East German 
vacationers. The failure of these efforts eventually led not only to Honecker's 
political collapse but also to the collapse of the Wall that he helped construct 
in 1961.18 
Fraud in the 1989 election 
East German efforts to deal with the democratic spirit sweeping Eastern 
Europe in 1989 demonstrated that while the regime enjoyed greater 
institutional maturity than in the past, there were clear limits to the viability of 
the GDR as a state and that the GDR could not isolate itself from events 
taking place elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The elections in the spring of 1989 
were a dramatic reminder of the continuing threats to the stability of the GDR. 
While authorities endeavoured to present the elections as a resounding 
endorsement of the regime, the reality appeared to be very different. 
Independent observers reported that "no" votes in the elections were 
significantly higher than authorities had acknowledged, running from a low 
of 3% to a high of 20% at various polling stations. Election officials 
acknowledged no more than 2% to 3% "no" votes. In addition, a much 
higher than normal percentage of eligible voters evidently chose not to vote. 
While there are no reliable national figures, unofficial returns reveal a turnout 
that did not reach 90% or even 80% in some electoral districts. When 
17 
18 
Bild, August 8, 1989, p. 1 
FBIS-EEU-89-155, August 14, 1989 p. 24 and The Washington Times, August 25, 
1989, p. A9 
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independent observers were denied the right to monitor the election count in 
Leipzig, security forces arrested those who chose to protest openly against 
the violation of procedures. Opposition groups charged that election results 
throughout the nation were altered in the official government counts and 
called on elected candidates to refuse to accept their mandates until the 
electoral procedures could be independently investigated.19 
In response to widespread charges of electoral fraud, 21 leading church 
figures issued an appeal for a new election law that would prevent future 
frauds. According to the group's statement, there was "large-scale and 
doubtlessly centrally ordered election fraud" in the May elections and when 
Honecker stresses that these "forged election results demonstrated the 
political-moral unity of our people", many East German citizens must ask 
"what kind of unity is this?" The authors of the appeal declared that without 
changes, East German society would face increasing "confrontation and 
polarization" that would further undermine the already weakened stability of 
the regime. By 1990, many East German officials acknowledged that the May 
elections had been rigged and that, as a result, there was no legitimate 
government in the GDR.20 This electoral experience was hardly'reassuring as 
the restructured SED faced the prospect of genuinely free elections. 
According to projections in the fall of 1989, a politically bankrupt but re-
named SED could expect somewhere between a low of 15% of the vote to a 
high of 34%, according to an optimistic survey in Berliner Zeitung. With 
reunification accepted as inevitable, East German spokesmen were 
increasingly resigned to facing political obscurity in the new order of a greater 
Germany.21 
Conclusions 
Following Gorbachev's rise to prominence in the USSR, the German 
Democratic Republic under Erich Honecker's leadership increasingly found 
itself in opposition to the reforms associated with the new Soviet leadership. 
For a regime that was created as an expression of Soviet policy and little 
more, this might seem to have been an extremely awkward position. Yet, 
~uring his last decade, Honecker's SED assumed this position with an 
mcreasing confidence and Honecker himself won recognition as a leader in 
Eastern Europe, not simply a German-language spokesman for the Kremlin. 
19 FBIS-EEU-89-087, May 8, 1989, p. 20 
20 Die Welt, August 2, 1989, p. 4 and Interview, GDR Embassy, Washington, DC, 
February 20, 1990 21 Eastern Europe Newsletter, Vol. 3, No. 22, November 6, 1989, p.2 and Berliner 
Zeitung,. January 4, 1990, p. 6 
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Several observations are prompted by this development and the turbulent 
events of 1989. First, it was apparent that the SED had the confidence to 
resist Soviet initiatives. That confidence was at least in part the result of East 
German accomplishments. By 1989 - before its massive population loss 
and the economic losses associated with Krenz's opening of the Berlin Wall 
- the GDR could boast what was, by East European standards, a strong 
economy in spite of the existence of some shortcomings. As so many have 
noted, the East German economy was and still is the envy of most East 
Europeans. The SED's confidence was also a product of a new Soviet 
position regarding East Europe. In Gorbachev's view, the USSR's allies 
enjoyed not only the right but had an obligation to adopt policies most suited 
to their special circumstances, especially when those policies might enrich 
East European economies that can expect limited Soviet assistance. With the 
USSR increasingly occupied by its own domestic problems, it was clear that 
the East European leaders were, with some qualifications, largely being left to 
their own devices. This decision placed most of East Europe's ruling parties, 
including that of the GDR, in an awkward position since they lacked the 
legitimacy enjoyed by the Soviet Communist Party. 
Second, necessity more than simple confidence in its own 
accomplishments prompted Honecker's SED to retain policies that were, in 
the context of the 1980s, fundamentally dogmatic. Of all the East European 
regimes, only the GDR has a frontier with another state that shares its 
language, elements of its culture and history, and offers its citizens an 
attractive alternative lifestyle. The flight of thousands East Germans in 1989 
was a dramatic reminder of just how great the West German appeal remains 
for thousands, if not millions, of East Germans. The development of a 
reform program like that of Hungary, Honecker reasoned, would seriously 
undermine the raison d'etre of the GDR by raising the obvious question of 
why there should be two Germanies if their social, political, and economic 
systems were similar. Widespread speculation about German reunification 
following Honecker's departure in October confirm the validity of the East 
German hardliners' concerns about the possible consequences of rapid 
political change. 
Third, the GDR's growing alienation from so many of its allies over the 
issue of reforms, coupled with its allies' assistance to escaping East 
Germans, was a grim reminder of the continuing instability of the GDR. It is 
estimated that in the summer of 1989, at least 50,000 East Germans were able 
to flee the GDR by way of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. This 
number continued to swell throughout the autumn and eventually disrupted 
the East German economy. The disruptive popular demonstrations in the 
wake of Gorbachev's visit in October, 1989 were another dramatic indication 
of the GDR's uneasy situation. It has long been taken for granted by both the 
SED and scholars of this system that a GDR apart from the Warsaw Pact 
would not be a viable international actor. The current crisis of East European 
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refonns tested that important assumption, first, by forcing the GDR into an 
anti-refonnist sub-bloc consisting of itself, Czechoslovakia, and Romania 
and, second, by propelling the SED regime down an uncontrolled reformist 
route that will apparently end the existence of East Gennany as a separate 
political entity. 
In spite of revelations about his government's involvement in 
international drug trafficking and illegal anns sales, Erich Honecker must be 
remembered as the leader who advanced political and economic policies that 
ensured the GDR's consistent, stable political development while also 
solidifying East Germany's position as the "second Gennan economic 
miracle."22 At the same time, he oversaw an international trend toward 
diplomatic acceptance of this second German state not only in the capitals of 
Eastern Europe and the Third World, but throughout the powerful non-
Communist Western nations. While the GDR may never have become truly 
important in the eyes of leading Western powers, it was accepted and 
recognized for its economic accomplishments and its rise from Soviet 
"puppet" to full partner in the Soviet alliance system. The key qualification in 
this Marxist-Leninist "success story" is that the GDR's position continued to 
be dependent on the full support of the USSR. By the GDR'.s 40th 
anniversary, it was clear to many among the SED political elite as well as 
much of the East German population that Honecker no longer enjoyed 
unqualified Soviet support. According to an account by a West Gennan 
official, Gorbachev took advantage of unrest in the GDR to undennine 
Honecker and secretly manoeuvred within the SED leadership to propel Egon 
Krenz and Hans Modrow into positions from which they could oust 
Honecker.23 Through the subsequent war of nerves, Gorbachev was able to 
engineer Honecker's removal and set the stage for creation of a new East 
Gennan regime that would initiate sweeping domestic changes and, for as 
long as it endured, give enthusiastic support to the Soviet Union's refonn 
model. 
22 Die Welt, January 27-28, 1990, p. 1 
23 The Washington Post, November 11, 1989, p. Al 
